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Among the many events that made the year 2020 so memorable were
the passing of Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg and ensuing confirmation of
Justice Amy Coney Barrett to the Supreme Court. Much was made of
Justice Barrett’s judicial philosophy during her confirmation hearings,
with many critics focusing on her commitment to an originalist reading of
the Constitution, as well as her treatment of precedent. Ramos v.
Louisiana was the only case that directly overturned constitutional
precedent during the Court’s previous term. In light of this holding, her
judicial views, especially her belief that originalism does not conflict with
stare decisis because the former requires a judge to adhere to the
“ultimate precedent” in the Constitution, might put the already tenuous
status of stare decisis in greater jeopardy. Confusingly, in Ramos a
majority of the Court’s Justices held that the Sixth Amendment requires a
unanimous jury for felony convictions in state courts, but failed to reach
agreement on whether there was an applicable precedent in the form of
Apodaca v. Oregon. As a result, the majority opinion invited several
concurring opinions that disagreed with the treatment of Apodaca by
certain Justices comprising the majority, and one acerbic dissenting
opinion. To assess how Justice Barrett might fare in the Court’s post‐
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Ramos jurisprudence, this Article examines Ramos’s majority, concurring,
and dissenting opinions. Then, based on her relevant academic writings
and judicial opinions on stare decisis and constitutional law, this Article
speculates about how Justice Barrett might have voted in Ramos had she
been a member of the Court at that time.

I.

Introduction

Consider the following: A jury in a Louisiana state court votes 10-2
to convict a man of murder. The individual appeals his conviction on the
basis that Louisiana’s law permitting nonunanimous juries to hand out
felony convictions violates the Sixth Amendment to the United States
Constitution. The case eventually reaches the Supreme Court, and the
nine Justices find themselves facing one of two possible choices. First,
they can vote to overturn the conviction by striking down Louisiana’s
law as unconstitutional. To do so, they would have to confront a prior
decision that acknowledged the validity of such laws, but conveniently
there is ample evidence to support the view that the Sixth Amendment
requires unanimous juries for felony convictions, proving the Court’s
prior decision was an anomaly. Alternatively, the Justices could resign
the man to his fate with little effort or justification by simply invoking
the doctrine of stare decisis.
This was the precise situation the Court faced in the 2020 case of
Ramos v. Louisiana.1 Logic suggests that the Court’s Justices would have
voted along their ideological lines. A popular narrative, after all, is that
“all Democrat-appointed Justices are reliably liberal and all Republicanappointed Justices are reliably conservative.”2 Yet, the actual holding of
Ramos was unusual to say the least; the Justices put forth sharply
conflicting understandings of the principle of stare decisis in a 6-3
decision, which consisted of several vigorous concurring opinions and
one dissenting opinion.3
The murkiness surrounding the principle of stare decisis and its
application was thus made evident in Ramos. The end result was that a

1

Ramos v. Louisiana, 140 S. Ct. 1390, 1393-1395 (2020).
Daniel Epps & Ganesh Sitaraman, How To Save the Supreme Court, 129 YALE L.J.
148, 156 (2019).
3 As summarized in Ramos’s syllabus, only the late Justice Ginsburg and Justice
Breyer joined all parts of Justice Gorsuch’s majority opinion, with Justice Sotomayor and
Justice Kavanaugh joining different parts of the majority opinion and Justice Thomas
only agreeing with the judgment. The three concurring Justices filed separate opinions,
whereas Justice Alito, joined by Justice Roberts and Justice Kagan, issued a dissenting
opinion. Ramos, 140 S. Ct. at 1392.
2
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remarkably fractured Supreme Court struck down Louisiana’s law at
issue, decided that the scope of the Sixth Amendment guaranteed the
constitutional right to a unanimous jury to be convicted for serious
crimes in state courts, and incorporated the provision through the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 4 In doing so, the six
Justices who agreed on the outcome had the aforementioned choice of
directly overturning the Court’s prior holding in Apodaca v. Oregon. 5
But even those six Justices failed to reach an agreement in a rather
spectacular fashion, with Justice Gorsuch along with two other Justices
refusing to acknowledge Apodaca’s validity. At the other end, led by
Justice Alito, the three dissenting Justices vehemently defended
Apodaca on the basis of stare decisis, emphasizing the necessity to
uphold what they deemed to be applicable precedent.6
Put this way, the result of Ramos may seem somewhat reasonable.
As this Article explains, however, Justice Gorsuch’s reasoning in Ramos
might pose significant risks to the doctrine of stare decisis when
exercised by the Court later down the road. And any cracks in the logical
basis behind stare decisis created by Ramos could very well worsen in
the future thanks to Justice Amy Coney Barrett’s confirmation to the
Court. This is because of her unique—and perhaps troubling—view that
there exists a pragmatic harmony between originalism and stare
decisis—the former requires judges to abide by the ultimate precedent:
the originalist interpretation of the Constitution.
This Article
accordingly argues that given the ideological disagreements between
the current Justices of the Court, stare decisis will be a woefully
inadequate shield for defending the Court’s previous jurisprudence
moving forward. Then, based on Justice Barrett’s previous writings and
opinions, this Article concludes by predicting how Justice Barrett might
have voted in Ramos.

II.

Understanding Ramos
A. THE SIXTH AMENDMENT AND APODACA: A PRELUDE TO RAMOS

To properly understand Ramos, we must head to the very
beginning by turning to the text of the Sixth Amendment of the Bill of
Rights, which states:
4 Ramos, 140 S. Ct. at 1397 (concluding that “if the Sixth Amendment’s right to a
jury trial requires a unanimous verdict to support a conviction in federal court, it
requires no less in state court.”).
5 See Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972).
6 Ramos, 140 S. Ct. at 1425-26 (Alito, J., dissenting).

LEE (DO NOT DELETE)

298

4/27/2021 11:14 PM

SETON HALL LEGISLATIVE JOURNAL

[Vol. 45:2

In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy
and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the
crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been
previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause
of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the
Assistance of Counsel for his defence.7

As is the case with most debates and disagreements in the realm of
constitutional law, nearly each word of the Sixth Amendment is subject
to some level of ambiguity and disagreement. With the slightest stretch
of imagination and minimal creativity, any two lawyers are capable of
engaging in grueling debates regarding the respective meaning of the
eighty-one words comprising the Sixth Amendment, which has, in fact,
been thoroughly argued in the courts. 8 With respect to Ramos the
particular word at issue was the term “impartial.”9 Indeed, what does it
mean for a jury to be impartial? Because the text of the Sixth
Amendment does not offer much, if any, guidance on this issue, the role
of the jury as practiced in common law might provide much-needed
assistance in deciphering what the term was intended to mean.10
The common law understanding of the term “impartial” appears to
have incorporated a number of different meanings, one of which was the
firm requirement of juror unanimity for a defendant to be criminally
convicted in court.11 Those meanings, however, were not all included in
the Sixth Amendment, and through the doctrine of selective
incorporation, the Court incorporated most, but not all, of the
protections within the Bill of Rights through the Due Process Clause of

7

U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
Other than the right to trial by an impartial jury, the persisting legal issues
surrounding the Sixth Amendment include the right to confront and cross-examine
witnesses, compulsory process to obtain defense witnesses, and assistance of counsel.
BURT NEUBORNE, An Overview of the Bill of Rights, in FUNDAMENTALS OF AMERICAN LAW 83,
109 (Alan B. Morrison ed., 1996).
9 Ramos, 140 S. Ct. at 1395 (stating that “[t]he text and structure of the Constitution
clearly suggest that the term ‘trial by an impartial jury’ carried with it some meaning
about the content and requirements of a jury trial.”).
10 Joan L. Larsen, Ancient Juries and Modern Judges: Originalism’s Uneasy Relationship
with the Jury, 71 OHIO ST. L.J. 959, 990 (2010) (explaining that the text of the Sixth
Amendment “does not on its face help us decide what a jury is, or what it means to be
tried by one.”).
11 Apodaca, 406 U.S. at 407-08 (finding “the requirement of unanimity arose during
the Middle Ages and had become an accepted feature of the common-law jury by the
18th century.”).
8
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the Fourteenth Amendment.12 This practice was adopted as opposed to
total incorporation. 13 It logically follows that parts of the original
meaning were dropped along the way, as the common law
understanding of an impartial jury traveled to state courts.
Nevertheless, state courts’ actual practices regarding the jury
system for felony trials before and after the ratification of the Sixth
Amendment, including the requirement for unanimity, seem to have
been fairly consistent throughout early American legal history. The
established facts indicate that the jury system referred to “twelve lay
persons, who reached their verdict unanimously, and passed upon both
fact and the law.”14 Sadly, heightened racial tensions, especially during
and following the Reconstruction period, disrupted the common law
understanding of a jury trial.15 As black jurors appeared in courtrooms,
attacks on them followed, centered on accusations that they were likely
to be more lenient toward defendants than white jurors.16 In the long
run this chain reaction gave birth to Louisiana and Oregon’s problematic
laws that permitted felony convictions by nonunanimous juries. 17 In
retrospect, the historical background of nonunanimous jury provisions
leaves little doubt that they were passed for racist reasons
notwithstanding their facially and purportedly race-neutral language.18
Then came Apodaca and its sister case Johnson v. Louisiana.19 At
issue in Apodaca was whether the Sixth Amendment permitted felony
convictions by nonunanimous juries in state courts. 20 Since both
Louisiana and Oregon had legislation that did not mandate jury
unanimity to render felony convictions in place, the Court was asked to
address the constitutionality of such laws that enabled nonunanimous
verdicts to stand.21
12 Aliza B. Kaplan & Amy Saack, Overturning Apodaca v. Oregon Should be Easy:
Nonunanimous Jury Verdicts in Criminal Cases Undermine the Credibility of Our Justice
System, 95 OR. L. REV. 1, 21-22 (2017).
13 Richard J. Hunter, Jr. & Hector R. Lozada, A Nomination of a Supreme Court Justice:
The Incorporation Doctrine Revisited, 35 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 365, 374-75 (2010).
14 Larsen, supra note 10, at 998.
15 Thomas W. Frampton, The Jim Crow Jury, 71 VAND. L. REV. 1593, 1641 (2018)
(“[R]acial prejudice has always infected American’s criminal jury system.”).
16 Id. at 1603.
17 Id. at 1612 (“The broader political context, however, helps demonstrate how the
adoption of nonunanimous verdicts in particular was motivated by racial bias.”).
18 See id. at 1612-14, 1616-20.
19 Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 366 (1972).
20 See generally Apodaca, 406 U.S.
21 Id. at 411 (summarizing the petitioners’ claim as arguing that the Sixth
Amendment requires “a unanimous jury verdict in order to give substance to the
reasonable-doubt standard otherwise mandated by the Due Process Clause.”).
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In Apodaca, four Justices ultimately found juror unanimity to be
required by and applicable to state courts through the Sixth
Amendment, whereas four other Justices performed what was
essentially a cost-benefit analysis to conclude that juror unanimity
could not be imposed on state courts. 22 Stuck between those two
irreconcilable views, Justice Lewis F. Powell Jr. concluded that while the
requirement of juror unanimity did form part of the Sixth Amendment,
the notion had not been fully incorporated with respect to state courts,
and Oregon’s law was therefore not inconsistent with the Due Process
Clause. 23 As such, the Constitution did not preempt states from
convicting felony crimes by nonunanimous juries.24
In a civil or hybrid legal system, Apodaca might have mattered less
than it did in the U.S. common law system. Being an obvious outlier in
the Court’s jurisprudence, 25 perhaps Apodaca would not have carried
any binding precedential force.26 But in a common law system such as
the U.S., Apodaca allowed Louisiana and Oregon to retain their
preexisting laws, and permitted other states to potentially follow suit.27
At a minimum, the impact of this case was substantial in Louisiana and
Oregon. 28 In the latter, for example, a significant number of felony
22 Id. (explaining that a requirement of unanimous juries would cause an increase in
the number of hung juries when nonunanimous juries can sufficiently protect a
defendant’s rights).
23 Justice Powell’s concurring opinion was rendered as part of Johnson v. Louisiana.
Johnson, 406 U.S. at 371, 375 (explaining that even though the Sixth Amendment
requires unanimous juries for criminal convictions in federal courts, “there is no sound
basis for interpreting the Fourteenth Amendment to require blind adherence by the
States to all details of the federal Sixth Amendment standards.”).
24 Id.
25 The Court called Apodaca an exception, created by an unusual split between the
Justices, to the general rule that the Fourteenth Amendment does not apply to the states
as a “watered-down, subjective version of the individual guarantees of the Bill of Rights.”
The Court added that “[o]nly a handful of the Bill of Rights protections remain
unincorporated.” McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 765, n.14 (2010).
26 Vincy Fon & Francesco Parisi, Judicial Precedents in Civil law Systems: A Dynamic
Analysis, 26 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 519, 524 (2006) (“Under jurisprudence constante
doctrines a judge is not bound by a single decision in a single previous instance.
Authoritative force stems from a consolidated trend of decisions on a certain point. The
practice of the courts becomes a source of law when it matures into a prevailing line of
precedents.”).
27 There is a counterargument that the theoretical basis of common law does not
recognize an individual case as a final rule of law. Graham Hughes, Common Law
Systems, in FUNDAMENTALS OF AMERICAN LAW 9, 18 (Alan B. Morrison ed., 1996).
28 In both states, individuals were convicted by nonunanimous juries only to be
eventually exonerated. See generally Zoe Chevalier, The Prisoners Who Were Convicted
by
Hung
Juries,
THE
NATION
(Oct.
8,
2020),
https://www.thenation.com/article/society/louisiana-non-unanimous-juries/; Conrad
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convictions were reached by nonunanimous jury verdicts until Ramos
was rendered,29 and all of this was in spite of legitimate concerns and
issues surrounding the conduct of nonunanimous juries. 30 For a
decision that the Court subsequently referred to as “one exception to
this general rule,”31 Apodaca had far more than a tangential impact on
individual constitutional rights.
B. RAMOS V. LOUISIANA
Given the confusion and chaos that was Apodaca, ironically, Ramos
may very well be a worthy successor. At the outset, the Court’s holding
in Ramos seems simple enough: six Justices voted—against the dissent
of three of their colleagues—that the Constitution requires convictions
by unanimous juries for serious crimes in state courts, effectively setting
aside Apodaca for good.32 But as this Article explains, Ramos is anything
but simple.
In Ramos, the petitioner, Evangelisto Ramos, was convicted of
second-degree murder by a 10-2 jury verdict in Louisiana and
sentenced to life in prison. 33 The petitioner appealed his conviction,
first to the Fourth Circuit, and then to the Supreme Court, arguing that
Louisiana’s law was problematic because it permitted convictions by a
nonunanimous jury for a felony; this law, he argued, contravened his
constitutional right to an impartial jury under the Sixth Amendment.34
The Court found that the Sixth Amendment incorporated the common
law practice of juror unanimity in the term “trial by impartial jury,” and
Wilson, Exonerations Raise Questions About Oregon’s Controversial Jury System, OREGON
PUBLIC BROADCASTING (Sept. 20, 2018), https://www.opb.org/news/article/oregon-nonunanimous-juries-exonerations.
29 The specific percentage was in excess of forty percent. Kaplan and Saack, supra
note 12, at 19.
30 Kaplan and Saack, supra note 12, at 33-34 (explaining that jurors are more likely
to sympathize with similar defendants whereas nonunanimous juries are also more
likely to be verdict-driven than unanimous juries). There was also evidence indicating
that nonunanimous juries eschewed accuracy and thoroughness of in favor of efficiency.
Kim Taylor-Thompson, Empty Votes in Jury Deliberations, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1261, 1273
(2000) (stating that “empirical research alerts us to the fact that majority rule
discourages painstaking analyses of the evidence and steers jurors toward swift
judgments that too often are erroneous or at least highly questionable.”).
31 McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 765, n.14 (2010).
32 Ramos, 140 S. Ct. at 1390, 1397.
33 Evangelisto Ramos’s conviction was in June 2016. Louisiana subsequently
amended its state constitution in 2018 to eliminate felony convictions by a
nonunanimous jury, but the amendment only applied to crimes committed on or after
January 1, 2019. Id. at 1419 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring).
34 The Fourth Circuit judgment contains additional factual details surrounding the
crime and trial of Evangelisto Ramos. They have been omitted here in order to focus on
the topic. State v. Ramos, 231 So.3d 44, 46-50 (2017).
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that this right applied to both federal and state courts through the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, thereby striking down
Louisiana and Oregon’s laws.35 The path Justice Gorsuch took and his
specific reasoning, however, may have laid the groundwork for an
uncertain future for the principle of stare decisis as it is exercised by the
Court.
Noting that juror unanimity had long been required in both state
and federal criminal cases,36 Justice Gorsuch, writing for the majority,
pointed to Apodaca as an obvious outlier based on which Louisiana and
Oregon’s laws had been allowed to stand.37 And Apodaca logically had
to mean either that “the Sixth Amendment allows nonunanimous
verdicts, or the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of a jury trial applies with
less force to the States under the Fourteenth Amendment.”38 Peculiarly,
Louisiana itself did not argue for Apodaca to apply as binding precedent,
but instead asserted that juror unanimity had been intentionally carved
out of the Sixth Amendment by way of a revision to its text,39 or was
simply not important enough to be included in the first place. 40 The
majority rejected both arguments. 41 Eschewing any urge to subject
unanimity to a functionalist analysis—akin to what one faction of the
Apodaca court had done—the majority limited its reasoning to the
acknowledgement that the Sixth Amendment unequivocally required
unanimous verdicts for felony convictions.42

35

Ramos, 140 S. Ct. at 1397 (concluding that “[t]here can be no question either that
the Sixth Amendment’s unanimity requirement applies to state and federal criminal
trials equally.”).
36 Id. at 1396-97 (explaining that juror unanimity was universally accepted
throughout American legal history and the Court had consistently confirmed it prior to
Apodaca). For a criticism of Justice Gorsuch’s analysis of the historical and universal
acceptance of jury unanimity, see generally Nicholas M. Mosvick and Mitchell A. Mosvick,
The Heller‐ization of Originalism: Ramos v. Louisiana and the Problem of Frozen Context,
2020 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 309 (2020).
37 Ramos, 140 S. Ct. at 1399 (noting that with respect to Apodaca, “no one has found
a way to make sense of it.”).
38 Id. at 1398.
39 Specifically, Louisiana argued that explicit references to unanimous verdicts had
been removed from James Madison’s original proposal by the Senate. In response, the
majority pointed to the removal possibly being due to language surplusage and
implications regarding other removed terms as the basis for rejecting Louisiana’s view.
Id. at 1400. It should be noted that the Apodaca plurality found the explanation “that the
deletion was intended to have some substantive effect” to be more convincing than the
counterargument. Apodaca, 406 U.S. at 410.
40 Ramos, 140 S. Ct. at 1400-01.
41 Id. at 1401-02.
42 Id. at 1402 (“[A]t the time of the Sixth Amendment’s adoption, the right to trial by
jury included a right to a unanimous verdict.”).
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To address Justice Alito’s dissenting opinion, the majority then
addressed the elephant in the room: did Justice Powell’s concurring
opinion in Apodaca deserve the benefit of the doubt per the principle of
stare decisis?43 Here, three of the Justices answered in the negative and
subsequently rejected Justice Powell’s reasoning.44 Regarding how to
approach a plurality opinion, Justice Gorsuch parted with the dissent on
how to read Marks v. United States,45 which had held that where fewer
than five Justices agree on a given case, the “position taken by those
Members who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest grounds”
shall be deemed to be the holding. 46 According to the dissent,
irrespective of the fractured nature of the decision, the Marks rule
awarded precedential force to Apodaca even without the agreement of
a majority of the Court. 47 Justice Gorsuch, Justice Breyer, and Justice
Ginsburg argued, in contrast, that Marks did not apply to Justice Powell’s
opinion at all.48 This was because both the plaintiff and the defendant
in this case agreed that Justice Powell’s opinion carried no precedential
force since the basis for that opinion was the consistently rejected dualtrack rule of incorporation. 49 As its secondary argument, the dissent
argued for the precedential effect of Justice Powell’s opinion with
respect to at least the result. 50 But Justice Gorsuch was unwilling to
validate the result of Justice Powell’s opinion without also taking its
reasoning into account and dismissed this argument as well.51
In the next section of Ramos the majority reasoned that even if
Apodaca had precedential force, the Court would nevertheless be
43 Id. at 1402 (casting doubt on the notion that “a single Justice writing only for
himself has the authority to bind this Court to propositions it has already rejected.”).
44 Id. at 1430 (Alito, J., dissenting). Only Justice Gorsuch, Justice Ginsburg, and
Justice Breyer agreed on this part. To the dissent, this was a baffling assertion, especially
since the Court had denied certiorari to a number of similar cases following Apodaca. Id.
at 1429 (Alito, J., dissenting) (“The idea that Apodaca was a phantom precedent defies
belief.”). But, the Court had previously stated that “those denials have no precedential
significance.” McDonald, 561 U.S. at 868.
45 Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188 (1977).
46 Id. at 193.
47 Ramos, 140 S. Ct. at 1430 (Alito, J., dissenting) (“This rule ascribes precedential
status to decisions made without majority agreement on the underlying rationale, and
it is therefore squarely contrary to the argument of the three Justices who regard
Apodaca as non-precedential.”).
48 Justice Gorsuch declared that “Marks has nothing to do with this case.” Id. at 1403.
49 Id. (pointing out that “both sides admit that Justice Powell’s opinion cannot bind
us”).
50 Id. at 1404.
51 Id. at 1404 (dismissing Justice Alito’s argument for distinguishing between
Apodaca’s result and reasoning because “stripped from any reasoning, its judgment
alone cannot be read to repudiate this Court’s repeated pre-existing teachings on the
Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments.”).
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compelled to overturn it, especially since the principle of stare decisis is
at its weakest when deliberating questions of constitutional law. 52
Consistent with the traditional framework for determining whether to
overturn precedent, the Court considered the following factors: “the
quality of the reasoning behind the decision at issue, consistency
between it and related decisions, legal developments since the decision
was rendered, and reliance on the decision.”53 Applying this framework,
the Court’s analysis was rather straightforward. Both the reasoning
behind the Apodaca plurality opinion and Justice Powell’s opinion were
poor because they were “gravely mistaken,” and Apodaca was
inconsistent with case law prior and subsequent to its rendering,
thereby allowing the majority to move on to the issue of reliance
interests.54
Here, in addition to vociferously disagreeing with the majority’s
treatment of Apodaca, Justice Alito further expressed concern that a
significant number of defendants convicted of felonies in Louisiana and
Oregon by nonunanimous juries would challenge their convictions,
which would unduly burden those states because they would be forced
to retry many of the pending cases. 55 In that regard, Louisiana and
Oregon were relying on Apodaca remaining good law to assure the
finality of the cases that would be affected by the majority’s decision.56
The majority once again disagreed, reasoning that new rules of
criminal procedure inevitably affect pending cases to some extent.57 If
anything, the majority expected the Ramos decision to cause less
disruption than other previous decisions on criminal procedure.58 More
importantly, because Teague v. Lane59 prohibits retroactive application
of rules of criminal procedure unless accepted as “watershed rules,” the
majority surmised that the impact of its holding in Ramos would be

52 On the contrary, stare decisis is at its strongest in the realm of statutory law. Amy
Coney Barrett, Statutory Stare Decisis in the Court of Appeals, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 317
(2005) [hereinafter Barrett, Statutory Stare Decisis].
53 Ramos, 140 S. Ct., at 1405.
54 Id. at 1405-06.
55 This is likely to happen because Oregon handed out felony convictions by
nonunanimous juries in more than forty percent of all jury cases. Kaplan and Saack,
supra note 12, at 19.
56 Ramos, 140 S. Ct. at 1436 (Alito, J., dissenting).
57 Id. at 1406.
58 Id. at 1406-07 (“Our decision here promises to cause less, and certainly nothing
before us supports the dissent’s surmise that it will cause wildly more, disruption than
these other decisions.”).
59 Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989).
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narrowly limited in scope. 60 The reliance interests of Louisiana and
Oregon would be adequately addressed in a future case involving the
question of whether the majority’s new rule passes the Teague
threshold. 61 Ultimately, the majority concluded that the American
people’s reliance in their constitutional liberties prevailed over
whatever interest Louisiana and Oregon held in maintaining Apodaca as
good law.62
C. CONCURRING OPINIONS
Justice Sotomayor, agreeing with all parts of Justice Gorsuch’s
opinion except for its view on whether Apodaca was precedent,
concurred in the opinion and offered scathing criticisms of Apodaca by
listing three grounds on why it should be overturned.63 First, Apodaca
directly violated well-established strands of constitutional precedent.64
Second, stare decisis should be most respected in cases involving
property and contract rights, but no such rights were implicated here.65
Finally, because of their racist context, the laws of Louisiana and Oregon
together with Apodaca should be “relegated to the dustbin of history.”66
In his concurrence, Justice Thomas opined that the Court’s prior
interpretation of the Sixth Amendment’s requirement for jury
unanimity was permissible in light of the available evidence.67 Justice
Thomas then, however, criticized the Court’s reliance on the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and instead argued for
application of the Privileges or Immunities Clause.68 To Justice Thomas,
“[d]ue process incorporation is a demonstrably erroneous
60 Id. The dissenting Justices voiced concern that the mere possibility of retroactive
application would cause an undue burden. Ramos, 140 S. Ct. at 1437 (Alito, J., dissenting)
(“As long as retroactive application on collateral review remains a real possibility, the
crushing burden that this would entail cannot be ignored.”).
61 Id. at 1407. It appears that this question will be answered shortly, as the Court is
currently reviewing whether the Ramos rule passes the Teague threshold. Amy Howe,
Case preview: Justices will hear argument on whether unanimous jury ruling applies
retroactively, SCOTUSBLOG (Dec. 1, 2020), https://www.scotusblog.com/2020/12/casepreview-justices-will-hear-argument-on-whether-unanimous-jury-ruling-appliesretroactively/.
62 Ramos, 140 S. Ct. at 1408.
63 Id. at 1408 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
64 Id. at 1409 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
65 Id. (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
66 Id. at 1410 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). The dissent countered the third ground
by casting doubt on the connection between the allegedly racist context and
constitutional law and arguing that both states readopted their rules for policy-related
but non-racist grounds. Id. at 1426-27 (Alito, J., dissenting).
67 Id. at 1424 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
68 Ramos 140 S. Ct. at 1424 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment.”69 Further, since in his
view, Apodaca also erroneously concerned the Due Process Clause,
Justice Thomas would have corrected the alleged error by assessing the
issue under the Privileges or Immunities Clause.70
In his concurring opinion, after emphasizing that “no one advocates
that the Court should always overrule erroneous precedent,” Justice
Kavanaugh offered a three-factor test for determining when to overturn
precedent.71 Before all else, Justice Kavanaugh vouched for the need to
respect precedent noting that even if stare decisis is relatively weaker
in the context of constitutional cases, as opposed to statutory cases
where the legislative branch can correct its own statutes, “adherence to
precedent is the norm” in both situations.72 In his opinion, the Court
cannot overrule a precedent on the mere ground that it was wrongly
decided.73
But because the Court had failed to establish a clear, or even
consistent, criteria regarding the stare decisis factors throughout the
years, Justice Kavanaugh volunteered his own framework. First, the
decision at issue must be “grievously or egregiously wrong.”74 Second,
the decision must have caused “significant negative jurisprudential or
real-world consequences.”75 Lastly, overturning the decision must not
lead to an undue disruption of reliance interests.76 In effect, what is left
is a two-step test in which the Court must perform a threshold test on
the wrongness of the decision, and then a totality-of-the-circumstances
test regarding its past and future impact. 77 Justice Kavanaugh fully
admitted the limitations of his test, particularly that it cannot eliminate
disagreements between different Justices about the same case.78 When
viewed in that light, perhaps the greatest merits of this approach lie in
the trimming down of potential factors to consider whether to overturn
precedent.
69

Id. at 1424 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1423-24 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
71 Id. at 1412 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring).
72 Id. at 1413 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring).
73 Id. at 1414 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring) (“To overrule, the Court demands a special
justification or strong grounds.”).
74 Ramos, 140 S. Ct. at 1414 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring).
75 Id. at 1415 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring).
76 Id. (Kavanaugh, J., concurring).
77 Id. (Kavanaugh, J., concurring).
78 Specifically, the Court is bound to exercise discretion under this approach as well.
Id. at 1415 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring) (“[A]pplying those considerations is not a purely
mechanical exercise, and I do not claim otherwise. I suggest only that those three
considerations may better structure how to consider the many traditional stare decisis
factors.”).
70
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Justice Kavanaugh recognized the precedential force of Apodaca,
but after applying his own test he concurred with the majority that it
must be overturned.79 Under Justice Kavanaugh’s test: (1) Apodaca was
egregiously wrong in view of the original meaning of the Sixth
Amendment and prior and subsequent case law; (2) Apodaca caused
serious negative consequences by enabling the conviction of individuals
under an unconstitutional and racist rule, and; (3) overturning it would
not overly upset reliance interests since the new rule would most likely
not apply retroactively as a Teague exception.80 In this manner, Ramos
overturned Apodaca, but only under deeply confusing circumstances.

III.

Deliberating the Future of Stare Decisis
A. DEFINING STARE DECISIS

It would be an understatement to conclude that it is difficult to
make sense of what Ramos entails. It is even more challenging to predict
what will follow in the field of constitutional law, particularly with
respect to the principle of stare decisis. Known as the obligation to
“stand by the thing decided and do not disturb the calm,”81 stare decisis
is widely accepted as a distinctive feature of common law systems.82 In
place to ensure that courts will decide similar cases in a consistent
manner, in addition to promoting other crucial values, stare decisis is
the legal principle for awarding precedential force to prior court
decisions, and it transfers a court decision from the hands of the judge
into the realm of either binding or strongly persuasive legal principles.83
Put differently, stare decisis is what creates the notion of case law. 84
While precedent is respected in both common and civil law systems,
79

Id. at 1416 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring).
Ramos, 140 S. Ct. at 1419 (Kavanaugh J., concurring).
81 This is the Latin translation of the maxim “stare decisis et non quieta movere.”
James C. Rehnquist, The Power That Shall Be Vested in a Precedent: Stare Decisis, the
Constitution, and the Supreme Court, 66 B.U.L. REV. 345, 347 (1986).
82 LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 21 (1973).
83 See also Rehnquist, supra note 81, at 347-48 (explaining that stare decisis is
intended to promote values such as fairness, stability, predictability, and efficiency);
Hughes, supra note 27 (“Its formal ideology offers strong allegiance to the notion of the
binding force of precedent, on the theory that a legal system must protect settled
expectations which would be dangerously disturbed if the highest courts were free to
abandon positions that they had earlier declared with authority.”).
84 As mentioned above, prior decisions in civil law jurisdictions, while highly
persuasive, do not carry precedential force in the sense that prior decisions do not serve
as binding legal principles on the courts. FRIEDMAN, supra note 82, at 22 (“In Continental
law, all law (in theory) is contained in the codes. In common law many basic rules of
law are found nowhere but in the recorded opinion of the judges”).
80
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stare decisis is distinguishable from the civil law doctrine of
jurisprudence constante because under stare decisis even a single prior
decision can be binding on subsequent courts.85
To slightly digress, it is fascinating to trace the development of
stare decisis in American jurisprudence since the Thirteen Colonies
practically inherited the English legal system, including its preexisting
case law and the doctrine of stare decisis.86 As one might expect, English
precedents were strictly adhered to even after the American Revolution,
and the overarching attitude toward the common law was that its rules
came from natural law and were already in place for judges to
discover. 87 Because of this attitude courts were to strictly adhere to
prior decisions, and as such judges did not “create” law. 88 But the
situation transformed in the decades that followed. Riding on the
emerging belief that the common law was merely based on the
voluntary consent of individuals, “judges began to conceive of
themselves as the leading agents of legal change,” and simultaneously
started to embrace their authority to reject precedents.89 Eventually,
courts were no longer intimidated by stare decisis.90
The law is by no means static, regardless of whether it takes the
form of common or civil law. The law as it is now is unlikely to be held
to be true in the future, for changes routinely take place in the form of a
statute, case law, or other mediums. The law is constantly evolving and
reflective of external circumstances, which are shaped by the social and
political atmosphere surrounding the deliberation of each judge in
rendering a final judgment. To accommodate for the living nature of the
law, stare decisis must not be imposed as an absolute obligation.91 In a
sense stare decisis is a “compromise between the past and the future.”92
But as is often the case with the law itself, stare decisis is noble in
conception but flawed in execution. Courts’ application of stare decisis
85 Fon & Parisi, supra note 26, at 524 (explaining that under jurisprudence constante
precedent becomes a source of law only when there is a trend of similar decisions and a
single decision by itself cannot achieve such effect).
86 Rehnquist, supra note 81, at 348 (stating that stare decisis was carried over to the
American Colonies).
87 MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860 5-8 (1977).
88 Id. at 9 (explaining that judges strictly followed precedent and saw their roles as
discovering preexisting common law rules during the late Eighteenth Century).
89 Id. at 23, 26.
90 Id. at 30 (stating that judges thought of and used the common law to effectuate
social change in the same manner as legislation).
91 Hughes, supra note 27, at 20 (“The chains of precedent must not bind too tightly,
and the doctrine of stare decisis is not unyielding.”).
92 Todd E. Freed, Comment, Is Stare Decisis Still the Lighthouse Beacon of Supreme
Court Jurisprudence?: A Critical Analysis, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 1767, 1777 (1996).
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can be wildly unpredictable and deeply confusing, and some have
openly questioned the actual extent of its role in the American legal
system. 93 More gravely, stare decisis can be thoroughly abused,
allowing judges to conveniently point to the doctrine as legal
justification for promoting his or her personal view of how the
particular law at issue should be.
In theory, of course, stare decisis requires courts to respect and
uphold previous decisions notwithstanding whether they personally
believe those decisions to be correct.94 Though not codified in statute,
stare decisis is a rule stemming from the general practice of the courts
and the structure of the common law system. From a practical
standpoint, stare decisis serves the purposes of “evenhandedness,
predictability, and the protection and legitimate reliance.”95 From the
train of thought offered by positivism, rules such as precedent are also
crucial because they carry value as imposing obligations for judges to
follow and restricting their discretion.96
While stare decisis has obvious merits, the requirement that courts
shall uphold a previous decision “simply because of its pastness” and in
spite of knowing it to be wrong creates serious causes for concern. 97
Needless to say, courts would have made no progress whatsoever
throughout the legal history of the U.S. had they blindly upheld prior
decisions only because certain cases came first, but courts have played
a vital, active role in bringing about legal progress.98 Despite support
for stare decisis, the Court has also been celebrated for overturning
prior decisions to promote developments in civil rights.
Confusingly, a consensus is lacking even on the precise boundaries
of the notion of stare decisis.99 To continue this discussion of Ramos and
93 Frederick Schauer, Stare Decisis—Rhetoric and Reality in the Supreme Court, 2018
SUP. CT. REV. 121, 130 (2019). As this Article will explain, Justice Barrett is deeply critical
of stare decisis as well.
94 Id. at 126 (“[T]he expectation embodied in the idea of stare decisis is that judges
of a court will, presumptively even if not conclusively, follow the previous decisions of
that court—by hypothesis and by definition no higher in the judicial hierarchy—even if
and when they think the previous decisions are mistaken.”).
95 Ramos, 140 S. Ct., at 1429.
96 See Stephen R. Perry, Judicial Obligation, Precedent and the Common Law, 7 OXFORD
J. OF LEGAL STUD. 215, 215 (1987) (“Where a court is not bound by such a rule its decision
always involves an exercise of discretion rather than compliance with any kind of
obligation imposed by law.”).
97 Schauer, supra note 93, at 125.
98 For a captivating account of this view in the context of the nascent decades of
American legal development, see generally HORWITZ, supra note 87.
99 Henry Paul Monaghan, Stare Decisis and Constitutional Adjudication, 88 COLUM. L.
REV. 723, 763 (1988) (“The precedent has been viewed as limited to the “decision” on
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its implications, we must broadly distinguish between two distinct
forms of stare decisis. The first form is vertical stare decisis. The
concept of vertical stare decisis is fairly straightforward and requires
courts to adhere to decisions rendered by higher courts.100 The other
form is horizontal stare decisis, which requires courts to follow
precedent rendered by that particular court.101 Combined, vertical and
horizontal stare decisis ensure that courts must heed their own past
decisions or those by higher courts at all times.
Once an absolute requirement, stare decisis—particularly in its
horizontal form—has dwelt in the territory of legal uncertainty in recent
American jurisprudence. At times it is an unbending, unrelenting force
of nature that precludes any deviations from the past. Then, at other
times, it is a red-headed stepchild, ignored and dismissed by a judge for
the purposes of actualizing a specific objective. Wildly, the role and
application of stare decisis had fluctuated in this manner all the way to
Ramos.
B. STARE DECISIS AT THE SUPREME COURT
In the case of the Supreme Court, vertical stare decisis is
inapplicable since there is no higher court. The Supreme Court is the
ultimate source of vertical stare decisis for lower courts and is itself only
subject to horizontal stare decisis. Unfortunately, the interaction
between Apodaca and Ramos highlights the difficult question of what
constitutes precedent. Stare decisis sheds little light on this issue for
future courts in instances where previous judges offered different lines
of reasoning, and where there is no obvious guidance for defining the
extent of essential criteria that constitute binding precedent. 102 As a
result, there are no feasible means of accurately predicting when the
Court will apply stare decisis and when stare decisis will be
eschewed.103 This is an open-ended, potentially grave question that has
created a tenuous relationship between past decisions and the current
Court.104
the “material facts” as seen by the precedent, or the same as seen by the non-precedent
court; for others, the term means the “rules” formulated by the precedent court; for still
others, the term includes the reasons given for the rules formulated.”).
100 Schauer, supra note 93, at 124-25.
101 Schauer, supra note 93, at 125 (“Horizontal precedent—stare decisis—is the
obligation of a court to follow the previous decisions of the same court.”).
102 Hughes, supra note 27, at 19.
103 Monaghan, supra note 99, at 743.
104 Randy E. Barnett, Trumping Precedent With Original Meaning: Not As Radical As It
Sounds, 22 CONST. COMMENT. 257, 261 (2005) (“How and when precedent should be
rejected remains one of the great unresolved controversies of jurisprudence.”).
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As previously mentioned, as a general principle, the Court has
traditionally given less weight to stare decisis in constitutional cases
than in statutory cases. 105 Still, this does not mean the Court has no
qualms about overturning its earlier constitutional cases. Rather, even
in the realm of constitutional law, stare decisis remains the norm.106 As
evidenced by the fact that Ramos was the only decision to overturn
constitutional precedent during the Court’s previous term, 107 the
consensus seems to be that stare decisis is still firmly entrenched in both
theory and practice.108
Even then, because of the absence of vertical stare decisis, stare
decisis cannot restrict the Court to the same degree that it binds lower
courts. The doctrine’s legal effect is therefore significantly limited at the
Supreme Court compared to any other court. 109 The Court cannot
strictly apply stare decisis in all situations because individual Justices
essentially have discretionalbeit with some theoretical
restrictionson when to uphold existing precedent since there is no
binding rule with respect to preexisting or closely related issues.110 In
reality, stare decisis has not prevented Justices from working around
the doctrine to independently craft legal opinions of their liking, 111
despite persisting concerns that overturning precedent puts the Court’s
legitimacy in question.112
It is understandable then that some have called for the Court to
completely abandon stare decisis,113 while others have suggested that

105

Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 235 (1997).
Freed, supra note 92, at 1776.
107 Valerie C. Brannon, et al., Cong. Research Serv., R46562, Judge Amy Coney Barrett:
Her Jurisprudence and Potential Impact on the Supreme Court, 12 (Oct. 6, 2020),
http://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R46562.
108 Amy Coney Barrett, Precedent and Jurisprudential Disagreement, 91 TEX. L. REV.
1711, 1728 (2013) [hereinafter Barrett, Precedent].
109 Id. at 1713 (“In the Supreme Court, stare decisis is a soft rule; the Court describes
it as one of policy rather than as an inexorable command.”).
110 Perry, supra note 96, at 215 (explaining that courts always exercise at least some
discretion if there is no binding rule).
111 Schauer, supra note 93, at 131 (“As long as there are available in the decisional
toolbox of the Justices multiple ways of rationalizing the avoidance of a seemingly
applicable previous decision, the existence of that decision seldom stands as a
significant barrier to what seems now to the Court or to individual Justices as the better
decision to make, precedent aside, for the case before them.”).
112 For a succinct summary of this view, see generally Rehnquist, supra note 81, at
353-55. And perhaps no one is more concerned about the legitimacy of the Court than
Chief Justice John Roberts. See generally Thomas J. Molony, Taking Another Look at the
Call on the Field: Roe, Chief Justice John Roberts, and Stare Decisis, 43 HARV. J. L. & PUB.
POL’Y 733 (2020).
113 Rehnquist, supra note 81, at 371-75.
106
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Congress may abrogate stare decisis by statute. 114 Nevertheless, the
Court cannot simply rid of stare decisis altogether because doing so
would place the innate value of precedent at peril.115 A number of other
alternative suggestions have been raised, but none seem practical or
even feasible.116 Evidently, stare decisis will remain a legal quagmire for
the Court in the future.
Against this backdrop, that some members of the Court declined to
accept Apodaca as binding precedent is a startling notion.117 Apodaca
may very well have been an outlier in terms of the manner in which the
Court was split and in its interpretation of the Sixth Amendment, but the
implications of Ramos pertaining to stare decisis are nevertheless
troublesome.118 It might be true that Justice Powell’s opinion stood on
relatively shakier grounds than, say, a unanimous opinion by the Court.
But there is certainly some merit to Justice Alito’s argument that
Apodaca was nonetheless binding as to its result. If a single Justice
cannot bind the Court by agreeing with a group of four other Justices
with respect to the result, would two Justices suffice? The lack of
guidelines might give rise to a line-drawing problem because
disagreements in the Court are to be expected.119
Drawing lines in the Court is becoming increasingly challenging
because of the politicization of the Court.120 To some, its politicization
may very well be ominous. 121 From the doomed attempt to appoint
then-circuit judge Merrick Garland, to the bitter appointment of the
three Trump-appointees, there is valid concern that the Court has
become no more than another political arena, especially in light of the

114

See generally Michael Stokes Paulsen, Abrogating Stare Decisis by Statute: May
Congress Remove the Precedential Effect of Roe and Casey?, 109 YALE L.J. 1535 (2000).
115 Freed, supra note 92, at 1780-81 (“[O]nce an absolute rule of stare decisis is
dismissed, there is no objective yardstick for measuring adherence to the rule of
precedent.”).
116 See Bradley S. Shannon, AMERICAN LEGAL PROCESS 504-05 (2015).
117 It is also unclear whether Justice Sotomayor, Justice Kavanaugh, and Justice
Thomas view the concurring opinion or plurality opinion of Apodaca to be binding. Sixth
Amendment—Right to Jury Trial—Nonunanimous Juries—Ramos v. Louisiana, 134 HARV.
L. REV. 520, 528-29 (2020) [hereinafter Sixth Amendment].
118 Cf., Freed, supra note 92, at 1780 (explaining that stare decisis can be diminished
once Justices begin to treat precedent lightly).
119 Sixth Amendment, supra note 117, at 520 (noting that “[p]lurality decisions are
becoming more common” at the Court).
120 Epps & Sitaraman, supra note 2, at 150 (“The predictable result is a Supreme Court
whose Justices—on both sides—are more likely to vote along party lines than ever
before in American history.”).
121 Epps and Sitaraman, supra note 2, at 151 (“[A] democracy that loses its confidence
in law may not long survive.”).
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significance of each Court decision on American politics. 122 Although
the battle at the Court begins with the nomination process—with some
of the most recent confirmation hearings being downright ugly at
times—once appointed, there is absolutely no question that the
opinions of the Justices are shaped by their personal views and
proclivities.123
In recent years, following the retirement of Justice Anthony
Kennedy and prior to the confirmation of Justice Barrett, there was
rising optimism that Chief Justice John Roberts might serve as the swing
vote,124 as well as corresponding skepticism.125 Where the truth lies will
be discovered in the following years, but at the most fundamental level,
it is plausible that Justice Roberts will usually be found somewhere in
the middle. The incompatible disagreements will originate from the
extremes of the spectrum.126
On the liberal end of the spectrum, even without the late Justice
Ginsburg, the Justices deemed by many to be living constitutionalists
run the risk of going too far. For one thing, some have expressed hope
that Justice Sotomayor will serve as a messenger for liberal Justices.127
Alarmingly, Justice Sotomayor has been called upon for this role and
celebrated for her non-academic appearances without regard to her
specific views on the Constitution.128 It is not that Justice Sotomayor will
122 Jeremy Kidd, New Metrics and the Politics of Judicial Selection, 70 ALA. L. REV. 785,
811 (2019) (“Now that most of our most important political questions are destined to
be decided by judges rather than by legislatures or bureaucrats, those who seek political
outcomes must care about the political preferences of the judges.”).
123 Jeffrey F. Addicott, Reshaping American Jurisprudence in the Trump Era – The Rise
of “Originalist” Judges, 55 CAL. W. L. REV. 341, 346 (2019) (“[E]veryone understands that
the “law they follow” is often dictated by their positions set along an ideological
spectrum, which ranges from the conservative “originalist” interpretation of the
Constitution to the liberal living “constitutionalist,” i.e., a “living, breathing” document
view of the Constitution.”).
124 Adam Liptak, In a Term Full of Major Cases, the Supreme Court Tacked to the Center,
THE
NEW
YORK
TIMES
(Jul.
10,
2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/10/us/supreme-court-term.html.
125 Victoria Bassetti, John Roberts is an Institutionalist, Not a Liberal, FINANCIAL TIMES
(Jul.
1,
2020),
https://www.ft.com/content/2248b2e3-b911-48ec-9eeb632c0c26ab16.
126 As a reminder, only Justice Gorsuch, Justice Breyer, and the late Justice Ginsburg
concluded that Apodaca was not precedent. The remaining six Justices agreed that
Apodaca was indeed precedent, but only three of them believed that it should be upheld.
127 David Fontana, The People’s Justice?, 123 YALE L.J. FORUM 447, 471 (2014)
(“Sotomayor could make the message of liberal Justices more appealing by affiliating it
with an appealing messenger.”).
128 Whereas other Justices are similarly labeled as conservative or liberal, Justice
Sotomayor seemingly does not even need the pretenses of referring to the Constitution
to promote her liberal views. Id. at 473 (“Unlike Justice Scalia’s originalism, Justice
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lean toward rendering a liberal legal opinion because her jurisprudence
and trained reading of the Constitution leads her down that path. She
will probably do so because she is liberal per se, an observation that
blurs the line between the law and the person applying it.129 And the
path Justice Sotomayor took in Ramos is no friend of stare decisis.130
On the other end, besides the old conservative vanguards Justice
Thomas and Justice Alito, 131 the Trump-appointed Justices are still
something of an unknown commodity. 132 Notably, both Justice
Kavanaugh and Justice Gorsuch are adherents to the school of
originalism, although how faithful they remain to the philosophy is
debatable. 133 For Justice Kavanaugh, Apodaca undeniably carried
precedential force, but the decision still deserved to be overturned.134
Perhaps his new three-factor test is intended to simplify the process for
overturning precedent to make it more convenient in future cases.135
Nevertheless, it is interesting that those two originalist Justices—Justice
Gorsuch and Justice Kavanaugh—ultimately voted to endorse jury
unanimity, either by overturning or circumventing precedent, which, as
previously discussed, is undoubtedly closer to the original
understanding of the Sixth Amendment than the outcome of Apodaca
was.136
Breyer’s pragmatism, or even Justice Souter’s fair reading model, there is little in what
she states in her extrajudicial remarks that indicates a brave new theory of the Court or
the Constitution.”).
129 Justice Sotomayor has previously explained her approach to deciding cases in
terms of her personal convictions rather than her constitutional views. Id. at 467.
130 Nina Varsava, Precedent on Precedent, 169 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 118, 132 (2020)
(“This standard would set a relatively low bar for overruling precedent in the criminal
procedure realm.”).
131 There is an argument that Justice Thomas, for what it is worth, would give
“effectively no binding force to precedent.” Id. at 132.
132 The emerging narrative has been that Justice Kavanagh or Justice Gorsuch could
serve as the new swing vote, instead of Justice Roberts, when it comes to particular areas
of the law. See generally Daniel Harris, The New Swing Votes on the U.S. Supreme Court,
114 NW. U. L. REV. 258 (2020).
133 See generally Addicott, supra note 123.
134 Ramos, 140 S. Ct. at 1419 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring) (asking why the Court should
“stick by an erroneous precedent that is egregiously wrong as a matter of constitutional
law, that allows convictions of some who would not be convicted under the proper
constitutional rule, and that tolerates and reinforces a practice that is thoroughly racist
in its origins and has continuing racially discriminatory effects?”).
135 Cf. Varsava, supra note 130, at 131 (Justice Kavanaugh’s preference for
streamlining the framework for overturning precedent might be to “clear the air for
future decisions in which he plans to vote to overrule precedent”).
136 From their perspective, perhaps Apodaca had to be overturned because it, in
effect, involved the Court positively affirming a departure from the original meaning of
the Sixth Amendment. Larsen, supra note 10, at 984 (“[O]riginalism typically is quite
comfortable with change; its only enemy is change imposed by judges.”).
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For originalists such as Justice Gorsuch and Justice Kavanaugh, it
could be that their self-prescribed duty is to correct the Court’s
jurisprudence in accordance with the original meaning of the
Constitution.137 Apodaca, for example, had to be overturned because it
conflicted with the original meaning of the Sixth Amendment regarding
jury unanimity. 138 But originalism is patently inconsistent with the
Court-led social changes that have taken place over the past decades.139
Thus the popular narrative post-Ramos that Justice Kagan may have
sided with the dissenters in order ask them to respect stare decisis later
down the road for cases involving abortion, LGBT, and other rights in a
similar vein makes sense, 140 even though Justice Alito and Justice
Roberts might not reciprocate because of their acknowledgement that
Ramos itself is now binding precedent.141
All of these fundamental disagreements among the Court are likely
to be aggravated by the passing of Justice Ginsburg—a defining figure in
battling sex discrimination laws and a promoter of social change142—
and her replacement by Justice Barrett. This replacement will lead to a
worsening ideological clash between the Justices on significant social
rights developments that were implemented and enforced directly by
the Court during the Twentieth Century.143 For liberals in particular, the
current makeup of the Court is bound to be extremely concerning.144

137

Barnett, supra note 104, at 269 (“Where a determinate original meaning can be
ascertained and is inconsistent with previous judicial decisions, these precedents should
be reversed and the original meaning adopted in their place.”).
138 Ramos, 140 S. Ct. at 1396-97.
139 See Monaghan, supra note 99, at 739.
140 Sam Berten, The Long Game: Justice Kagan’s Approach in Ramos v. Louisiana,
UNIVERSITY
OF
CINCINNATI
LAW
REVIEW
(May
26,
2020),
https://www.uclawreview.org/2020/05/26/the-long-game-Justice-kagans-approachin-ramos-v-louisiana; Ed Whelan, Justice Kagan and Stare Decisis, NATIONAL REVIEW (Apr.
20, 2020) https://www.nationalreview.com/bench-memos/Justice-kagan-and-staredecisis/.
141 See Varsava, supra note 130, at 132 (“[T]o the extent that Ramos has set a
precedent about precedent, it is the Justices in the dissent who will feel most compelled
to follow it going forward—after all, they apparently endorse a stricter approach to
precedent than any of the other Justices.”).
142 See generally Michael J. Klarman, Social Reform Litigation and Its Challenges: An
Essay in Honor of Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, 32 HARV. J. L. & GENDER 251 (2009).
143 See Monaghan, supra note 99, at 728 (“In addition to Brown, it seems evident that
the abortion cases, the reapportionment cases, and the sex discrimination cases are also
inconsistent with any constrained conception of the original understanding.”).
144 This was the case even before Justice Barrett’s ascension from the Seventh Circuit.
See Epps & Sitaraman, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 168 (“The new
Supreme Court majority is arguably the most reliably conservative in history, and there
is reason to believe it will strike down laws that progressives favor using doctrinal
theories that are at least open to a serious question.”).
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Justice Gorsuch’s degeneration of stare decisis in this context might
cause even greater doubts. Where the Justices diverge greatly on their
views on a particular case or issue, stare decisis is capable of performing
a crucial role by mediating between the two extremes and enabling
them to sidestep certain delicate legal issues. 145 Stare decisis would
thus effectively act as an equalizer by forcing Justices with contrasting
opinions to grudgingly agree to maintain the status quo out of respect
for precedent. With a blatantly conservative Court, however, liberal
circles fear that many of the Court-led social changes could be
undone.146 Whether their fear will hold true is yet to be determined.147
For instance, at the end of Ramos Justice Gorsuch concluded the
majority opinion by stating, “it is something else entirely to perpetuate
something we all know to be wrong only because we fear the
consequences of being right.”148 But the nine Justices currently sitting
on the Court will unquestionably disagree on what is right or wrong, and
with their conflicting views, stare decisis alone will be insufficient to
lead them into reaching an agreement. Since it is plausible that one or
more vacancies will occur in the near future, this predicament could
worsen because of the disparity between the rising influence of the
Justices and the difficulty of accurately ascertaining their political
preferences before appointment.149 And if Justices can circumvent stare
decisis altogether, à la Justice Gorsuch in Ramos, 150 an even murkier

145 See generally, Precedent, Barrett, supra note 108, at 1716-25. Stare decisis could
also mediate between Justices with conflicting opinions by allowing them to opt for the
status quo so that the issue may be addressed again in the future. See Barrett, Precedent,
supra note 108, at 1724.
146 Joan Biskupic, The Supreme Court Hasn’t Been this Conservative Since the 1930s,
CNN, Sept. 26, 2020, https://edition.cnn.com/2020/09/26/politics/supreme-courtconservative/index.html; Adam Liptak, Barrett’s Record: A Conservative Who Would
Push The Supreme Court To The Right, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 2, 2020,
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/12/us/politics/barretts-record-a-conservativewho-would-push-the-supreme-court-to-the-right.html.
147 So far, the liberal side of the Court attained a noteworthy victory in Bostock v.
Clayton County, 140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020). In that case, the majority, against three
dissenting Justices in Justice Alito, Justice Kavanaugh, and Justice Thomas, held that
employers may not fire employees for being gay or transgender under Title VIII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964. Id. at 1754. That, of course, was before Justice Barrett’s
confirmation.
148 Ramos, 140 S. Ct. at 1390, 1408.
149 Kidd, supra note 122, at 811.
150 Varsava, supra note 130, at 132-33 (explaining that both the majority and the
dissenting Justices are likely to follow the “relaxed doctrine of precedent”).

LEE (DO NOT DELETE)

2021]

4/27/2021 11:14 PM

STARE DECISIS ON THIN ICE

317

future might be waiting ahead for the Court in light of Justice Barrett’s
views on stare decisis.151
C. ENTER JUSTICE BARRETT: WHAT COMES AFTER RAMOS?
Ramos laid the groundwork for hacking away at the notion of what
constitutes precedent, and what happens from here will heavily depend
on Justice Barrett. During her nomination and confirmation process
much was made of her religious upbringing and personal views. 152
Many believed those factors telegraphed a willingness—if not intent—
to overturn the Court’s previous rulings on issues such as the Affordable
Care Act or abortion. 153 These concerns stemmed from the widely
accepted perception of Justice Barrett,154 famously known for being a
former law clerk of Justice Scalia, 155 as a staunch originalist and
textualist.156 In her own words, Justice Barrett’s legal philosophy can be
summarized as the belief that “the meaning of the constitutional text is
fixed at the time of its ratification” and the historical meaning of the text
should be controlling.157

151 This is separate from the intriguing and confusing inquiry of whether “Ramos
could be applied to Ramos itself to justify a departure from the Ramos approach to
precedent.” Varsava, supra note 130, at 133.
152 For a succinct summary of Justice Barrett’s upbringing, see generally Elizabeth
Dias et al., Rooted in Faith, Representing a New Conservatism, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11, 2020,
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/11/us/politics/amy-coney-barrett-life-careerfamily.html.
153 Amy Goldstein & Alice Crites, Judge Barrett’s writing criticizes the Supreme Court
decision upholding Obama‐era health law, WASH. POST, Sept. 29, 2020,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/health/judge-barrett-aca-health-carelaw/2020/09/28/429d165e-ff4c-11ea-b555-4d71a9254f4b_story.html; Emma Green,
No One Likes Amy Coney Barrett’s Abortion Answer, THE ATLANTIC, Oct. 13, 2020,
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2020/10/amy-coney-barrett-roe-vwade/.
154 Barrett, Precedent, supra note 108, at 1075 (“Reliance interests count, but they
count far less when precedent clearly exceeds a court’s interpretive authority than they
do when precedent, though perhaps not the ideal choice, was nonetheless within the
court’s discretion.”).
155 On Justice Scalia, she previously stated, “[h]is judicial philosophy is mine too.”
Remarks by President Trump Announcing His Nominee for Associate Justice of the Supreme
Court
of
the
United
States,
TRUMP
WHITE
HOUSE
ARCHIVE,
https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-presidenttrump-announcing-nominee-associate-justice-supreme-court-united-states/
(last
visited Mar. 31, 2021).
156 Upon her nomination, Justice Barrett affirmed this perception that a “judge must
apply the law as written,” while former President Trump added that she “will decide
cases based on the text of the Constitution as written.” Id.
157 Amy Coney Barrett & John Copeland Nagle, Congressional Originalism, 19 J. CONST.
L. 1, 5 (2016).
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Understandably, Justice Barrett’s originalist views have been
criticized for being badly outdated and logically inconsistent. 158 And
despite Justice Barrett’s ardent defense, 159 Justice Scalia’s purported
“pragmatic” application of originalism was in itself inherently
discretionary.160 This was no more evident than in his wish to ignore
the Ninth Amendment altogether.161 But with life tenure and a solidly
conservative majority now occupying the Court, whatever logical holes
that can be found in originalism will have very little consequences
outside of the academic circle.
So what does Justice Barrett, the author of several articles on the
topic, think of stare decisis? Justice Barrett’s articles yield the
conclusion that her views on stare decisis have been remarkably
consistent, and that she has been anything but a proponent for its rigid
application. First, she is skeptical that stare decisis is a firmly
established rule with deep historical roots.162 The notion of a single case
binding successive courts,163 Justice Barrett argues, pales in comparison
to the civil law system in which only a series of similar holdings can

158

Erwin Chemerinsky, The Philosophy That Makes Amy Coney Barrett So Dangerous,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 21, 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/21/opinion/supremecourt-amy-coney-barrett.html. The existence of the U.S. Air Force would be
unconstitutional under a textualist and originalist interpretation of the Constitution.
Angus King Jr, Amy Coney Barrett’s Judicial Philosophy Doesn’t Hold Up to Scrutiny, THE
ATLANTIC,
Oct.
25,
2020,
https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/10/originalism-barrett/616844.
For her part, Justice Barrett believes the creation of the U.S. Air Force is a “super
precedent” created by Congress and the President. Barrett & Nagle, supra note 157, at
24-25.
159 Justice Barrett especially insists that Justice Scalia was selective in overturning
precedent. Amy Coney Barrett, Originalism and Stare Decisis, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1921, 1933 (2017) [hereinafter Barrett, Originalism] (“He was willing to overrule
precedent outright in the above cases because he thought that the error was clear and
that traditional stare decisis factors like reliance or workability counseled it.”).
160 Notably, Justice Scalia himself confessed that totality of the circumstances tests
are inevitable to a certain extent. Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56
U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1187 (1989). Justice Scalia also once wrote that “no reasonable jury
could conclude otherwise” regarding the applicable facts when not even all nine
members of the Court had agreed. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 386 (2007).
161 Ken Levy, Why the Late Justice Scalia Was Wrong: The Fallacies of Constitutional
Textualism, 21 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 45, 69–70 (2017) (“Apparently, Justice Scalia’s metaconstitutional position was that when the facts inconveniently threaten your
constitutional theory, simply pick different facts.”).
162 Amy Coney Barrett, Stare Decisis and Due Process, 74 U. COLO. L. REV. 1011, 1065
(2003) [hereinafter Barrett, Stare Decisis] (explaining that stare decisis is deemed to be
a relatively modern rule in American jurisprudence).
163 Justice Barrett is presumably critical of this notion. See Barrett and Nagle, supra
note 157, at 43 (“The question whether settled precedents constitute “law” in a positivist
sense is a complicated jurisprudential one that we do not tackle.”).
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carry precedential force. 164 Second, she is of the view that the
application of stare decisis, even with regard to statutory cases, should
be limited.165 Third, she frowns upon stare decisis’s practicality because
she believes it limits the number of arguments litigants could raise in
their own case, 166 and therefore, it must be applied in a flexible
manner.167 As did her ideological mentor Justice Scalia, Justice Barrett
simultaneously acknowledges a tension between stare decisis and
originalism,168 and would unwaveringly strike down a case she believes
to be in conflict with the Constitution. 169 Where the conflict is
demonstrable, Justice Barrett would give little, if any, weight to reliance
interests.170
But unlike Justice Scalia, who reconciled this conflict by labelling
stare decisis as a pragmatic exception to his views, 171 Justice Barrett
does so by perceiving—or construing—a harmony between originalism
and stare decisis. 172 Because the Constitution is the “original
precedent,” she concludes there is no per se conflict between the
principles of stare decisis and originalism.173 If a decision is consistent
with the originalist reading of the Constitution, then all is right in Justice
Barrett’s world. To the extent that there is any inconsistency, the
originalist reading of the Constitution must prevail as the original
precedent. By restoring the text and original meaning of the
Constitution, a judge therefore does not disregard stare decisis, but in
164

Justice Barrett seems almost envious of the civil law approach. See Barrett, Stare
Decisis, supra note 162, at 1067, 1072-1073 (stating that in a civil law system “[T]he
court’s only real tools for gauging the persuasiveness of an argument are the litigants’
arguments and the original text” and like jurisprudence constante, a line of judgments is
what gives a rule precedential force because “[i]t is the existence of the line of cases, not
any one case, that gives a proposition its force”).
165 Barrett, Statutory Stare Decisis, supra note 52, at 352 (arguing that there is no
reason for statutory stare decisis at the circuit court level to be “anything more than the
simple presumption against overruling that all opinions enjoy”).
166 Barrett, Stare Decisis, supra note 162, at 1075 (criticizing the role of stare decisis
because “litigants are bound to results obtained by those who have gone before them”).
167 Barrett, Stare Decisis, supra note 162, at 1013.
168 Barrett, Precedent, supra note 108, at 1724.
169 Barrett, Precedent, supra note 108, at 1728 (“I tend to agree with those who say
that a justice’s duty is to the Constitution and that it is thus more legitimate for her to
enforce her best understanding of the Constitution rather than a precedent she thinks
clearly in conflict with it.”).
170 Barrett, Stare Decisis, supra note 162, at 1062.
171 Barrett, Originalism, supra note 159, at 1921–22.
172 Barrett, Originalism, supra note 159, at 1923 (“Originalism thus places a premium
on precedent, and to the extent that originalists reject the possibility of deviating from
historically-settled meaning, one could say that their view of precedent is particularly
strong, not as weak as their critics often contend.”).
173 Barrett, Originalism, supra note 159, at 1924.
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fact adheres to the ultimate precedent. The fact that Justice Barrett does
not see a conflict here means she would have fewer reservations than
her mentor about overturning precedent.
Nevertheless, according to Justice Barrett, the concerns
surrounding the conservative shaping of the Court may very well be
overblown because there are safeguards in place that would limit the
number of challenges to duly established precedent.174 Conveniently,
stare decisis cannot clash with originalism if the question of whether
such “super precedent” contravenes the Constitution does not arise in
the first place.175 Nor can the Court arbitrarily overturn previous cases
in defiance of the general public’s strong support for them.176
But critically, Justice Barrett candidly recognizes how the Court has
discretion to hear cases of its choice. 177 Thus while the Court would
generally refrain from accepting cases on which the general public has
reached a universal consensus, it has discretion to hear those it believes
to be in the gray zone. And as far as she is concerned, although
originalism does not obligate a Justice to eliminate all past decisions he
or she disagrees with, even duly established precedent is not immune.178
Moreover, it is evident that Justice Barrett does not deem cases such as

174 Barrett, Originalism, supra note 159, at 1929 (“A combination of rules—some
constitutional, some statutory, and some judicially adopted—keep most challenges to
precedent off the Court’s agenda.”).
175 Justice Barrett’s view is that super precedent is created not by stare decisis but by
its duly established status. Barrett and Nagle, supra note 157, at 22–23. Barrett and
Nagle, supra note 157, at 16–17 (explaining that the criticism of originalism as
misaligning with its principles with respect to super precedent is “contrived”).
176 Barrett, Precedent, supra note 108, at 1736 (explaining that strong public support
in cases such as Brown v. Board of Education prevents any challenges from reaching the
Court).
177 Barrett, Originalism, supra note 159, at 1930 (“[T]he Court’s discretionary
jurisdiction generally permits it to choose which questions it wants to answer.”);
Barrett, Stare Decisis, supra note 162, at 1015-16.
178 Barrett & Nagle, supra notes 157, at 20, 22 (explaining that a Justice has discretion
over seeking to overturn even super precedents despite the aforementioned safeguards
in place).
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Roe v. Wade 179 or Planned Parenthood v. Casey 180 to be super
precedents,181 as opposed to Marbury v. Madison,182 for example.183
Returning to the case at hand, while it is difficult, if not impossible,
to accurately predict how she would have voted as a Supreme Court
Justice, we may nevertheless attempt to ascertain which side Justice
Barrett might have joined in Ramos. 184 Judging by her own words,
Justice Barrett’s analytic checklist should consist of applicable
precedent, and then the textualist and originalist readings of the Sixth
Amendment. 185 The threshold question is whether Justice Barrett
would have deemed Apodaca to be binding precedent.186 On this point,
common sense suggests she would have sided with Justice Gorsuch
considering Apodaca’s status as an obvious outlier in the Court’s
jurisprudence and the peculiar nature of Justice Powell’s opinion. 187
Turning to the textualist and originalist analyses, determining how
Justice Barrett might have opined becomes far more difficult because
unlike the original meaning of the term “impartial,” as recognized by the
Ramos majority, the plain text of the Sixth Amendment does not require
jury unanimity. 188 In that sense there is a clash between a textualist
reading and an originalist one, 189 which means we have reached the
point where the general principle has gone “as far as it can go in
179

Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
181 See, e.g., Barrett, Originalism, supra note 159, at 1932, n.52; Barrett, Precedent,
supra note 108, at 1735, n.141. During her confirmation hearings, Justice Barrett
pointed to the fact that Roe v. Wade is continuously at the center of debate as proof it has
not achieved super precedent status. Brian Naylor, Barrett Says She Does Not Consider
Roe v. Wade ‘Super‐Precedent,’ NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Oct. 13, 2020),
https://www.npr.org/sections/live-amy-coney-barrett-supreme-courtconfirmation/2020/10/13/923355142/barrett-says-abortion-rights-decision-not-asuper-precedent. At the same time, it has been pointed out that Justice Barrett’s
purported dedication to originalism should, in theory, lead her to conclude that super
precedents such as Brown v. Board should be overturned as well. See King Jr. &
Richardson, supra note 158.
182 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
183 Justice Barrett offered the following Supreme Court decisions as examples of
super precedents which are extremely unlikely to be overturned: Marbury v. Madison,
Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, Helvering v. Davis, the Legal Tender Cases, Mapp v. Ohio, Brown
v. Board of Education, and the Civil Rights Cases. Barrett & Nagle, supra note 157, at 14.
184 See Brannon et al., supra note 107, at 5-7.
185 See Brannon et al., supra note 107, at 20 (quoting Justice Barrett’s response during
her confirmation hearing for the Seventh Circuit).
186 See Brannon et al., supra note 107, at 20 (quoting Justice Barrett as stating
whether precedent settles the issue is the preliminary question).
187 See Barrett, Stare Decisis, supra note 162, at 1073.
188 Mosvick & Mosvick, supra note 36, at 310-11.
189 Even critics of the holding of Ramos agree that the requirement of jury unanimity
was the consensus at least in 1791. Mosvick & Mosvick, supra note 36, at 323.
180
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substantial furtherance of the precise statutory or constitutional
prescription.” 190 All that is left is for Justice Barrett to exercise
discretion, for which there are no means of accurately ascertaining her
thoughts. Such discretion, rather than concrete legal principles, will
likely decide a great number of social and political issues for decades to
come.
The best we can do to try to trace her thoughts is to turn to some of
the opinions Justice Barrett personally penned during her short stay at
the Seventh Circuit.191 For that purpose her dissenting opinions might
be more illuminating than any majority or concurring opinion. 192
Although Apodaca’s status as an obvious outlier would likely preclude
Justice Barrett from acknowledging it as binding precedent, her
dissenting opinion in Schmidt v. Foster193 suggests she would construe
the holding of Apodaca quite narrowly even if she were to consider it
precedential. To briefly summarize her dissenting opinion in Schmidt,
Justice Barrett diverged from the majority on whether the Supreme
Court’s precedent on the right to counsel at a “critical stage” under the
Sixth Amendment applied to the petitioner’s situation.194
In Schmidt, the petitioner was charged with first-degree intentional
homicide and raised a provocation defense; as a result, the judge
decided to preliminarily question the petitioner in-person to assess the
validity of the petitioner’s claim. 195 Ultimately, the judge denied the
motion to present a provocation defense after questioning the
petitioner in his chambers in the presence of the petitioner’s counsel—
who did not speak—and without the prosecutor. 196 Based on these
190

Scalia, supra note 160, at 1183.
In roughly three years, Justice Barrett wrote about 100 majority, concurring, and
dissenting opinions. Adam Feldman, Empirical SCOTUS: A Comprehensive Look at Judge
Amy
Coney
Barrett,
SCOTUSBLOG
(Oct.
9,
2020),
https://www.scotusblog.com/2020/10/empirical-scotus-a-comprehensive-look-atjudge-amy-coney-barrett/. See Barrett, Precedent, supra note 108, at 1717 (stating that
a Justice’s “approach to the Constitution becomes evident in the opinion she writes.”).
192 It is the shared opinion of liberal and conservative Justices alike that they can
most clearly and strongly express their legal reasoning in dissenting opinions. See
William J. Brennan Jr., In Defense of Dissents, 37 HASTINGS L.J. 427, 435 (1986) (“[W]here
significant and deeply held disagreement exists, members of the Court have a
responsibility to articulate it.”); Ruth Bader Ginsburg, The Role of Dissenting Opinions, 95
MINN. L. REV. 1, 7 (2010) (“[A]lthough I appreciate the value of unanimous opinions, I will
continue to speak in dissent when important matters are at stake.”); Antonin Scalia, The
Dissenting Opinion, 19 J. SUP. CT. HIST. 33, 42 (1994) (stating that is a pleasure “[t]o be
able to write an opinion solely for oneself”).
193 Schmidt v. Foster, 891 F.3d 302 (7th. Cir. 2018).
194 Id. at 321 (Barrett, J., dissenting).
195 Id. at 306-07.
196 Id. at 307-08.
191

LEE (DO NOT DELETE)

2021]

4/27/2021 11:14 PM

STARE DECISIS ON THIN ICE

323

facts, the majority held the judge’s rejection of the defense was contrary
to Supreme Court precedent,197 and deprived the petitioner of his right
to counsel under the Sixth Amendment during a critical stage of the
proceeding.198
In her dissenting opinion, however, Justice Barrett interpreted the
relevant Supreme Court cases differently and more narrowly, reaching
the conclusion that precedent on what constitutes a critical stage is
strictly limited to “adversarial confrontations between the defendant
and an agent of the State.”199 Since the prosecutor was not present for
the interrogation within the judge’s chambers and the judge acted in a
neutral rather than adversarial manner, Justice Barrett disagreed with
the majority that the interrogation was a critical stage. 200 What we
might take from Schmidt is that Justice Barrett, faithful to her general
disinclination for stare decisis, would lean toward construing any
applicable precedent extremely narrowly where it does exist.201
Justice Barrett’s dissenting opinion in the 2019 case of Kanter v.
Barr 202 could offer further hints as to how she might determine the
original meaning of the Constitution. In Kanter, the Wisconsin state and
federal statutes at issue prohibited all persons convicted of a crime
punishable by imprisonment for more than one year from possessing
firearms. 203 The statutes’ reach covered the petitioner, who had
previously been convicted and imprisoned for one year and one day for
a non-violent crime. 204 Applying the post-Heller two-part test, 205 the
majority looked to historical evidence of non-violent felons being

197 Id. at 314 (“By looking both at what the Supreme Court has done and at what it
has said, it is clear that an evidentiary hearing on a contested substantive issue is a
critical stage of the proceedings.”).
198 Id. at 319-20.
199 Schmidt, 891 F.3d at 321.
200 Id. at 321, 327-28.
201 Still, as Ramos concerned the exact same issue as Apodaca, it would have been
difficult for her to distinguish between the two. The factual differences worth noting
can be summarized as the crimes the petitioners were charged with, with Apodaca
featuring assault, burglary, and grand larceny instead of murder, and that one of the
petitioners in Apodaca was convicted by an 11-1 vote rather than 10-2. See Apodaca,
406 U.S. at 405-06.
202 See Kanter v. Barr, 919 F.3d 437, 451 (7th Cir. 2019).
203 Id. at 439.
204 Specifically, the petitioner had faced up to twenty years for mail fraud. Id. at 440.
205 In assessing the constitutionality of a statute restricting the right to bear firearms,
the Court conducts a textual and historical analysis on whether the regulated activity is
within the scope of the Second Amendment, and if not, the Court then balances the
justification for regulating the activity with an individual’s rights under the Second
Amendment. Id. at 441 (explaining the Heller test).
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prevented from exercising their Second Amendment rights, before
ultimately upholding the constitutionality of the statutes.206
The majority’s historical analysis invited strong disagreement from
Justice Barrett. In her view, her colleagues on the bench were mistaken
in suggesting that felons may not have had the right to bear arms per the
original understanding of the Second Amendment. 207 Validating the
constitutionality of the concerned statutes through a historical analysis
would require the existence of “founding-era laws explicitly imposing—
or explicitly authorizing the legislature to impose—such a ban,” none of
which Justice Barrett believed existed.208 Placing utmost significance on
the plain text of the Second Amendment, 209 Justice Barrett narrowly
read the proposals made in the few states that provided “the only
evidence coming remotely close” to such laws and declined to view them
as supporting a restriction on the right of nonviolent felons to bear
firearms.210
Reading Schmidt and Kanter together, a couple of observations can
be drawn. First, Justice Barrett seems likely to lean toward interpreting
applicable precedent and facts on the narrowest possible grounds.
Consistent with her views on stare decisis, this might be an attempt to
limit the binding effect of precedent as much as possible. Second, as
expected, Justice Barrett will heavily rely on the text of the Constitution
in construing it, perhaps even over its historical context. That would
especially be the case if, as with the legislative history of the Sixth
Amendment, there is ample room to argue both ways. 211 Applied to
Ramos, the first point is irrelevant because Apodaca’s status as an
obvious outlier and the ambiguity of whether the Marks rule should
apply to Justice Powell’s opinion would enable her to avoid applying
Apodaca as binding precedent. Even though it would be nearly
206 While noting how the Seventh Circuit has suggested that the original meaning of
the Second Amendment was to award the right to bear arms to only virtuous citizens,
the inconclusive historical evidence allowed the majority to proceed to the second step
of the inquiry. Id. at 445-47.
207 Justice Barrett summarized her opinion of the issue of this case as “the question
is whether the government has the power to disable the exercise of a right that they
otherwise possess, rather than whether they possess the right at all.” Id. at 453.
208 Kanter, 919 F.3d at 454.
209 New Hampshire, Massachusetts, and Pennsylvania each submitted proposals that
contained language restricting the right of felons to bear arms, but Justice Barrett
downplayed them based on a textualist argument that “none of the relevant limiting
language made its way into the Second Amendment.” Id. at 455.
210 Id. at 454, 458 (concluding that the restriction on the right to bear arms pertained
to individuals posing “a threat to the public safety” instead of all felons in a categorical
sense).
211 Apodaca, 406 U.S. at 409 (stating that “one can draw conflicting inferences from
this legislative history”).
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impossible to distinguish the holding of Apodaca from that of Ramos,
Justice Barrett would, in all likelihood, simply refuse to give stare decisis
treatment to Apodaca. Rather, the second point would presumably
control Justice Barrett’s analysis, and the reality of the requirement of
jury unanimity being absent in the final text could persuade Justice
Barrett to disagree with the majority in Ramos.212 Justice Barrett might
reason that jury unanimity in state courts is not in line with the “original
precedent.” But in the end, any predictions as to what Justice Barrett
might have done are not, and simply cannot be predicated upon exact
science. Depending on who you ask, that is the beauty, or innate
shortcoming, of law.

IV.

Conclusion

“It is my job to apply the law,” Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes is
famously said to have declared in response to Judge Learned Hand’s
request that the towering legal figure “[d]o Justice.”213 The unfortunate
truth is that such a simple and noble task becomes exponentially more
difficult when there is no agreement on how the law should be applied,
or even what the law is.
The direct impact of Ramos is certainly forthcoming.214 As feared
by Justice Alito, defendants previously convicted by nonunanimous
juries in Louisiana and Oregon have asked for or might yet seek new
trials. 215 Beyond that, however, Ramos is not only bound to bring
collateral but potentially overreaching, long-term ramifications. The
Court’s treatment of stare decisis is disturbing for that reason. On one
hand, Justice Gorsuch has devised a means for circumventing the
precedential status of oddly split decisions that otherwise might have

212 As mentioned above, the absence of the requirement in the final text was part of
the basis for the plurality’s conclusion. Id. at 410. Justice Barrett voting in Justice
Ginsburg’s place would not have changed the outcome of Ramos. Nonetheless, Justice
Barrett’s presence could have made a difference by swaying some of the Justices who
sided with the majority. After all, the Court is most likely to overturn existing precedent
when new Justices have joined. Barrett, Precedent, supra note 108, at 1729, 1734-35.
213 ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 6
(Free Press) (1990).
214 Another potential consequence is that Ramos has put the Marks Rule in limbo. See
generally Sixth Amendment, supra note 117.
215 Matt Reynolds, Oregon and Louisiana Grapple With Past Criminal Convictions Made
With
Split
Verdicts,
ABA
JOURNAL
(Oct.
1,
2020),
https://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/after-ramos-decision-oregon-andlouisiana-grapple-with-split-verdicts. The scope of Ramos’s impact will heavily hinge
upon the Court’s decision in Edwards v. Vannoy, which will answer the question of
whether it passes the Teague test. See Howe, supra note 61.
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been protected by the Marks rule. 216 On the other hand, Justice
Kavanaugh has evinced his willingness to overturn prior decisions
provided that he deems the circumstances to be appropriate, and has
gone as far as to offer his own framework for doing so.217
While honorable in thought and delivery, Justice Roberts’s famous
declaration that there are no “Obama judges or Trump judges, Bush
judges or Clinton judges,” is frankly questionable.218 Indeed the clear
facts surrounding the rulings of the Court in recent decades suggest
otherwise. As a result, further battles are undeniably set to follow in the
Court and there is no question that the legal battlefield will closely
reflect the split in the American political and social atmosphere. And in
this battle, “the norm of stare decisis itself has been weaponized,” but
stare decisis can function properly “only if those who wield the weapon
of stare decisis would be willing to accept the bitter with the sweet.”219
A number of significant decisions loom on the horizon for the Court,
and as Ramos itself shows, old battlefields can be easily renewed. 220
While intended to provide assurance that “bedrock principles are
founded in the law rather than in the proclivities of individuals,” stare
decisis cannot account for the proclivity of the individuals holding the
ultimate authority to wield it.221 In reality, consistency or predictability
simply has not been found in the Court’s jurisprudence on stare
decisis.222 Unfortunately, Ramos suggests that this issue will be made
even more obvious in the years to come.223 With the political and social

216

Varsava, supra note 130, at 131.
Varsava, supra note 130, at 131.
218 See Addicott, supra note 123, at 360 (arguing that different judges will interpret
laws differently depending on which president appointed them).
219 Schauer, supra note 93, at 140-41.
220 Most notably, the Supreme Court will rule on the latest challenge to the
constitutionality of the Affordable Care Act in California v. Texas (Docket 19-840),
determine whether the community caretaking exception to the Fourth Amendment
permits warrantless searches of one’s home in Caniglia v. Strom (Docket 20-157), and
decide if the Eight Amendment requires trial courts to find juveniles to be incorrigible
to render life sentences in Jones v. Mississippi (Docket 18-1259).
221 Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 265 (1986).
222 Schauer, supra note 93, at 140 (“[T]here does not appear to be any who have
demonstrated the ability to combine their accusations of ignoring stare decisis with a
willingness to adhere to stare decisis when its effect is to reinforce or perpetuate
decisions they believe mistaken, or to support their sometimes vehemently professed
adherence to stare decisis with a willingness to relinquish their own proclivity to
persistent dissent.”).
223 Justice Gorsuch and Justice Alito recently expressed strong disagreement with the
Court’s refusal to review a challenge to existing precedent. Jason Small v. Memphis
Light, Gas & Water, 593 U.S. ____ (2021) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
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atmosphere surrounding the Court continuing to diverge in both
extremes, the end of this turmoil is nowhere near in sight.
As an ending note, this Article will offer two claims, both by Justice
Alito, on the principle of stare decisis. In Ramos, Justice Alito made a
spirited defense of the notion, arguing that “[t]he doctrine should not be
transformed into a tool that favors particular outcomes.” 224 Yet, less
than a year before Ramos, while writing for the majority in Janus v.
AFSCME 225 to overturn Abood v. Detroit Board of Education 226 on the
basis of the First Amendment, the same Justice Alito who so fiercely
fought for the “enormous reliance” of just Oregon and Louisiana on
Apodaca also wrote that the reliance of over twenty states on Abood “is
not a compelling interest for stare decisis.” 227 To make matters even
more interesting, Justice Breyer, Justice Ginsburg, and Justice
Sotomayor had all disagreed, perhaps even “angrily” with Justice Alito
and the rest of the majority. 228 In Ramos, by merely switching roles,
these Justices seemingly and eerily found themselves in The Twilight
Zone.229 And Justice Barrett has now arrived on set.

224

Ramos, 140 S. Ct. 1390, 1432 (Alito, J., dissenting).
Janus v. AFSCME, 138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018).
226 Abood v. Detroit Board of Education, 431 U.S. 209 (1977). This case permitted
labor unions to require non-members to pay union dues.
227 Ramos, 140 S. Ct. at 1425 (Alito, J., dissenting); Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2485, n.27.
228 Schauer, supra note 93, at 137 (summarizing Justice Kagan’s dissenting opinion
which criticizes Justice Alito’s majority opinion).
229 Specifically, the author is referring to an episode from the TV series, The Twilight
Zone, titled “Shadow Play.” For those who have not watched this particular episode and
would not mind having its plot spoiled, the male protagonist is sentenced to death by a
court but laughingly dismisses the verdict, claiming that he is merely having a recurring
nightmare. At the end of the episode, his claim turns out to be true, as the man once
again finds himself in another trial after he had been executed in the previous scene,
with the same characters now playing different roles at this subsequent trial.
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